I just heard Rory Stewart on Channel Thirteen talk about his views on if the US is doing the right thing by increasing troops in Afghanistan. Mr. Stewart is currently the Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. As a former British soldier he walked across Afghanistan in 2002 getting to know the Afghan people, understanding its culture and studying the country. He writes about his experiences in his book, The Places in Between
He eloquently spoke about how he believes that the US goal of creating a Nation State in Afghanistan with the indirect goal of added US security from the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits was impractical.

He goes on to add that it might take several decades for Afghanistan to have basic education, infrastructure, a judicial and military system etc. institutions that Pakistan has. However in my mind, this does not necessarily imply security against terrorism.

Unlike Mr. Stewart I am not an authority on such issues, but I do firmly believe that Pakistan’s current political instability and situation should be of greater concern to the US than Afghanistan. A new documentary called RethinkAfghanistan is currently online to be viewed. I’m personally not in favor of another war, this time Obama’s war!

An excerpt from Rory Stewart’s Irresistible Illusion :

“Furthermore, there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy). Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism. Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harbouring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).

It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives? Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.”